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South Africas land reform programme is based on the state providing grants to landless people who negotiate with white
landowners to purchase land. The high price of land, among other factors, has led to the emergence of joint ventures. In these
ventures, black people who have land rights or who are land reform beneficiaries engage in joint agricultural or other land-related
production with white commercial farmers, corporations or sectors of government. Are these schemes the answer to the difficulties
of entry into agriculture faced by land reform beneficiaries? Do they really contribute to agrarian reform, transforming the
countryside in South Africa, or are they mechanisms through which commercial farmers and others are able to reduce their risk and
in which poor people are exploited in new and different ways?
Approaches to joint ventures
Government plays an important role in the development of joint
ventures by enabling previously disadvantaged and poor people to
obtain access to land-based resources. This happens primarily
through the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) but other
departments, such as the Department of  Water Affairs and Forestry,
and spheres of government such as municipalities, also provide
opportunities and encourage these ventures.
Initially, DLA asserted that where private sector partnerships
spread the impact of land reform, government would support
them. The White Paper on South African Land Policy stresses that
that (e)nhanced security of tenure is the principal criterion in
such joint ventures (DLA 1997:46). In more recent policy there
has been a shift of emphasis. Now tenure security is not a
requirement of the scheme. In an internal memo on equity schemes,
DLA says that:
an attempt should be made to improve the security of tenure
of land reform beneficiaries on the farms. Increased tenure security
provides a tangible output for land reform beneficiaries participating
in the scheme even before other financial benefits are realised. (DLA
2002:20, emphasis added).
Government is, however, a limited player in joint ventures in South
Africa. Various corporate and commercial actors have direct interests
in developing joint ventures with previously disadvantaged people.
These interests include rationalising their operations, improving
the marketing profile of  the company, accessing capital for expansion
of  production and corporate social responsibility. In reality, the
private sector is the initiator and driver of most joint ventures
(including those funded by government) and therefore the ventures
need to be approached with much circumspection.
Types of joint ventures
There are five types of joint ventures
! contract or out-grower farming
! share equity schemes
! municipality schemes
! sharecropping or share-produce arrangements
! company-supported schemes.
Contract or out-grower farming
Contract farming is an agreement between small-scale farmers and
processing or marketing firms, in which farmers agree to supply an
agreed quantity of  goods of  a specified quality. In return, the farmers
are paid for the produce, but also receive support such as credit,
training and extension services as well as assistance with machinery
and other production resources.
In South Africa, contract farming has been most common in
the former bantustan areas. To expand land under production,
processors and marketers have persuaded people who have access
to land held under communal tenure to use it for contract farming.
This has enabled women to gain access to livelihoods in these
areas, even though access is through a male family member. The
most common crops grown through these arrangements have been
sugar, timber and cotton.
In freehold areas, companies are reducing their involvement in
certain phases of the production process, selling the assets to new
small-scale farmers who are able to access government grants or
credit, and contracting these phases out, often to previous
employees. This is common in the farming of  poultry, buchu (a
herb), chicory and paprika.
These schemes do not give secure and independent access to
land and capital  access is only granted for the production of a
specified product, and the land may not be put to other uses.
Contracting out is also a cost saving for the firms  they do not
have to address labour issues, and the exploitation that may happen
(often of family labour) is of no concern of theirs. But the schemes
can provide small-scale farmers with improved livelihood
opportunities. Acknowledging that farmers entering such schemes
often have little bargaining power, it is important to seek ways to
bolster this and increase opportunities for contract production.
Share equity schemes
Share equity schemes in agriculture are arrangements in which farm
workers or small-scale farmers buy shares in a commercial farm, or
an agricultural processing company.
The farm workers or small-scale farmers buy equity in these
farms or companies with subsidies from government, or through
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Equity schemes are most common in high value export sectors
because they provide access to very cheap capital for commercial
farmers who need to recapitalise in order to adapt to the unregulated
global commodity market. Share equity schemes also enable land
reform beneficiaries to overcome the barriers of entry into these
enterprises that are capital-, technology-, expertise- and labour-
intensive. Between 1994 and 2002, there were approximately 50
equity schemes established with the use of DLA grants, of which
20 were in the Western Cape.
Share equity schemes have the potential to provide participants
with a steady income through dividend payouts, and an asset that
can grow over time. However, they are very risky ventures, often
dependent on single crops and vulnerable to changes in export
markets. They are mostly initiated and determined by the commercial
farmers involved and farm worker participants are in some cases
not very clear on what their involvement is or what alternative
projects they could choose. Finally, the schemes often do not give
shareholders independent rights to land or secure tenure to their
houses. Instead, participation is dependent on continued
employment. The question which arises is whether they can therefore
really be considered to be land reform projects.
Municipal schemes
Section 152c of the Constitution prescribes that local governments
must promote social and economic development. Municipal
commonage is land that is legally designated for the use of the local
population and is most often used for agricultural purposes.
Commonage land is mostly found in the Northern, Western and
Eastern Cape and in the Free State.
The DLA has a programme that enables municipalities to
obtain additional commonage land for use by previously
disadvantaged people (see Anderson & Pienaar 2003; 2004). In
most cases, municipalities have supplied land for use by the local
community through a leasing procedure.
There are a number of examples, however, where the
municipality has taken on a more active role for reasons of politics
and/or development. Some municipalities have facilitated access to
markets for farmers; others have provided grants and access to
credit, training and mentoring.
These schemes provide a secure environment within which the
farmers can develop and gain capital and expertise. However, in a
complex dynamic, the intense involvement of the municipality can
result in a paternalistic undermining of farmers. Maintaining a
balance of providing opportunities while allowing farmers to
develop themselves is difficult, but important in these schemes.
Sharecropping or share-produce arrangements
Sharecropping or share-produce arrangements have been a common
form of joint ventures in South Africa. These are agreements in
which instead of paying a predetermined amount of rent, the
tenant agrees to give the landlord a share of the output (Canjels
1998:109).
Sharecropping agreements have generally been between a more
powerful landowner and a less powerful occupier or tenant. In
South Africa, this was a mechanism that black people used to retain
some hold on the land and engage successfully in commercial
agriculture during apartheid.
In post-apartheid South Africa, however, sharecropper
arrangements have been redeveloped where the balance of power
between the two partners is not as unequal. One example is where
workers on a grape farm agreed to work the land of a neighbouring
farmer in exchange for half  the crop, which they then bottled under
their own wine label (Hamman 1998).
Another example is where a Tsitsikamma community entered into
an arrangement with a white farmer who owned their land after
they were dispossessed in the 1970s. After they successfully claimed
their land back through the restitution programme, the two parties
established a joint venture. Each party receives 50% of the profit
from the venture  the community contributes the land (and has
accessed a grant for capital equipment), and the white farmer
contributes the cows, the machinery and the management expertise.
In cases such as this, share-produce arrangements can be more
favourable forms of joint venture as the farm workers or small-
scale farmers enter the arrangement with a scarce resource around
which they can bargain. In each case, however, the advantage for the
group is dependent on its ability to negotiate.
Company-supported schemes
Company-supported schemes are established as part of the social
responsibility programmes of  companies and mainly serve as a
marketing tool, showcasing the concerned company. As such, the
purpose is not to make direct profit for the company.
Depending on the capacity of  the company, benevolent
partnerships provide access to land, assist small-scale farmers to
access production resources and infrastructure, and facilitate access
to markets. The small-scale farmers often have previous and/or
ongoing employment relationships with the company. These
schemes can provide land-based livelihood opportunities but
involve complex relationships which can become paternalistic
because it is really only because of the benevolence of the company
that they exist at all.
Importance of joint ventures
DLA does not have comprehensive data on joint venture projects.
Furthermore, many of the projects do not involve the state and no
consolidated figures on these private schemes are available for all
sectors. In certain parts of  the country, however, joint ventures are
common projects within the states programme  for example,
18% of  the land reform projects approved in the Western Cape
between 1994 and 2002 were share equity schemes. So while they are
an important type of land reform project, it is unclear how significant
joint ventures are in the countrys agricultural sector as a whole.
Access to land
The most secure joint venture arrangement is where the access to
land  is completely separate from the business venture. Where black
communities have a resource that commercial farmers or
corporations need  such as land  the power of black people in the
arrangement increases. Given this, where DLA grants are involved,
the key result must be independent access to land.
Most joint ventures provide access to land but the ability to
make decisions about the use of the land is severely constrained.
This limits the livelihood opportunities of participants. Providing
a spread of tenure arrangements (access to individual portions
existing alongside company portions) is important to overcome
these constraints and should be designed into the venture from the
outset.
Not all joint ventures provide access to land. The most notable
of these are share equity schmes in which the shares acquired in the
enterprise have to be sold upon leaving. These schemes are therefore
not land reform projects, as they will not provide independent
access to land. But they are likely to provide a return on investment.
In this case, the Department of  Trade and Industry or the relevant
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department of agriculture (rather than DLA) should provide such
subsidies because their expertise is better suited to assess proposals
and monitor performance.
Access to livelihood resources
There have been severe cutbacks in state agricultural support since
the adoption of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(Gear) strategy. Small-scale farmers cannot therefore rely on the state
for support to access capital and other livelihood resources. Joint ventures
with commercial farmers are one of the ways in which poor people
can overcome these constraints. Ensuring that such ventures do
this and provide good returns is therefore very important. This can
be achieved through:
! ensuring good analysis of business plans
! factoring in all contributions that black people make to the
venture, not just the direct land reform grant (black people may
have preferential access to water licences, cheap additional credit,
or grants from other donors)
! ensuring involvement in the processing components (such as
the milling components of sugar production) as these are fre-
quently more profitable than primary production
! diversifying production on the farms to reduce risks such as
when the market of the main product fails.
The lack of business expertise amongst many poorer participants
has meant that the commercial partners often take decisions alone.
DLA does not have the capacity to monitor these once the grant has
been allocated. It is recommended that in each project an independent
party be appointed, sponsored by the state, whose task it is to look
after the interests of the small-scale farmers/ farm workers. This
person would be required to ensure that correct business decisions
are made and that the participants understand these decisions.
Capacity building
Building the management and business capacity of people is often included
as a key objective of joint ventures. Due to insufficient time, resources
and coherent planning, however, little is achieved in many projects
and expectations are often not met.
In smaller schemes it is unrealistic to expect the commercial
partner to devote sufficient resources to providing extension services.
Other mechanisms are therefore necessary:
! DLA should reintroduce a technical training fund to support
capacity building in agrarian reform.
! The extension services of  provincial departments of  agricul-
ture should offer marketing, management and business skills
as well as agricultural extension, and should also support part-
ners in joint ventures.
! Independent parties with ongoing mentoring roles should be
implemented as proposed above.
! Formal study is crucial. Goverment should intervene to en-
courage institutions to develop specific courses for those in
joint ventures, and provide support to enter these and existing
courses.
Building the capacity of small-scale partners involved in joint
ventures is key in the long-term and an integrated response from
government and other actors is required. If this does not take place,
the empowerment of people through these ventures will remain
limited and the dependence on white farmers who have the expertise
will continue.
Immediate benefits
Receiving immediate benefits from joint ventures is dependent on the
nature of the specific product and the nature of the agreement.
One of the objectives of joint ventures, especially where state funds
are involved, should be to ensure that there are immediate
improvements in peoples livelihood options. Actual changes are
necessary in the form of cash income or access to other benefits
such as land for housing or other production purposes, or in terms
of capacity development.
The lack of immediate benefits reduces committment to the
enterprise and, in schemes with long lead times, there is often
dissatisfaction. In those situations where the nature of the crop
requires a long-term investment of time, additional benefits are
needed if participants are to enjoy improved livelihoods and
maintain their commitment to the enterprise or project. Where the
returns are more immediate, such as with sugar and chicken farming,
these returns themselves could provide the incentive to remain
committed to the venture.
In the case of government grants, a criterion should be imposed
that business plans must make provision for immediate benefits
to beneficiaries.
Recommendations
Most share equity partners, small-scale farmers and other participants
in joint ventures are unorganised. Organisation is therefore needed
to bolster their participation in joint ventures. This will enable
sharing and improve the ability to strategise; enhance their
bargaining power in negotiations; and bolster their lobbying power
at a government and corporate level. Mechanisms to strengthen
the organisations should be found. Government has two roles:
! it can demand evidence of  organisation amongst the group.
! it can make funds available to support the organisation of
farm workers or small-scale farmers.
DLAs approach to land reform has been demand-led. This has
resulted in commercial farmers generally being able to determine
the types of projects which receive DLA support because they have
been the main drivers of joint ventures. DLA funds have therefore
often not been put into the best ventures from a financial and an
empowerment point of  view. A shift to a supply-led approach is
needed, proactively designing schemes with safeguards and
components that strengthen the hands of farm workers or small-
scale farmers.
Those who benefit from joint ventures are usually men, since
women generally do not have direct access to land, or are often not
permanent employees on farms. Nevertheless, women have found
ways to access shares in share equity schemes, or independent land
rights in contract farming in communal areas. Assessing the impact
of their participation and the benefits they obtain, however, is not
straightforward. The ventures may provide an improvement on
previous circumstances, but it may very well be that the woman
has entered into another, different kind of  exploitative relationship.
It is important for facilitators, and particularly those appointed by
DLA, to be aware of  womens interests, and to seek ways in which
to meet these interests through joint ventures.
Finally, where corporations have ongoing vested interests in
the success of the ventures, constant monitoring take place. By
contrast, little monitoring takes place in joint ventures which are
funded only by DLA. It should be assumed that government will
always have limited resources, and so monitoring needs to be
addressed within the project itself and independent of the state.
Commentators have proposed that a third party investor should
be encouraged. However, state resources are being put into joint
ventures and the progress should therefore be monitored.
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Mechanisms to clarify which aspects are most important in the
project would assist in targeting monitoring and making the most
economic use of the limited resources.
Conclusion
Because government has not prioritised land and agrarian reform,
it has not dedicated many resources to this end. Joint ventures
mobilise private sector resources to support land reform initiatives
and are seen to help poor people overcome the many barriers of
entry into commercial agriculture. At the same time, commercial
farmers and corporations are faced with changing circumstances:
they have to recapitalise to enter global markets; they have to show
their transformation commitments when marketing their goods;
and they are concerned with demonstrating their commitment to
transformation. Commercial farmers and corporations use joint
ventures to address these changed circumstances.
Joint ventures may address these various needs but should be
treated with caution. White commercial farmers and corporations
usually initiate and design joint ventures, and  their interests usually
dominate. Similarly, where local governments are involved, the
political interests of the councillors may dominate in the projects.
Joint ventures provide land reform beneficiaries with
opportunities to obtain access to land, capital and expertise. But
joint ventures are generally unequal arrangements, and the dominant
partners will seek to ensure that their interests are promoted. It is
important for farm workers, small-scale farmers and their facilitators
to understand this and to seek ways to increase their resources
(including land) and benefits from the scheme.
Where the government, and DLA in particular, is involved,
however, a more proactive role is required to ensure that the interests
of the previously disadvantaged dominate. This means initiating
more projects, being more prescriptive about the requirements for
a project to receive government support, and monitoring the
development of projects once funds have been allocated. If this
does not take place, state funds for land reform will end up bolstering
current landowners in agriculture and poor men and women will
once again have lost out.
For more information on this topic, see the full PLAAS project
report (Mayson 2003)
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